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Massive cities in China are experiencing a shift in their economic structure from 
traditional manufacturing to service and skill-intensive manufacturing, which leaves 
behind underused or abandoned industrial sites with real or perceived contamination 
problems in central cities and/or peripheral regions. A comprehensive and sustainable 
strategy for brownfield remediation and redevelopment, which embraces ecological, 
economic and social benefits, is a hot topic in China. However, the country is lacking a 
comprehensive and effective legal and regulatory framework for brownfield remediation 
and redevelopment, uniform national standards on site assessment, cleanup and 
remediation, and effective funding or financing mechanisms from the national level to 
local levels. 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine policy tools that are being adopted in China to 
deal with brownfield remediation and redevelopment, compare them to those employed 
in the United States, make recommendations to improve existing frameworks, and try to 
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Policy makers and planners have been giving increasing attention to brownfield 
remediation and redevelopment, since it combines three important components of 
sustainability: 
, the ecological component through the prevention of additional consumption of space, 
the economic component through the encouragement of investment in inner city sites; the 
social component through the combination of revitalization projects with job creation and 
skills upgrading programs, and through fostering residents’ sense of social and historical 
identification  (Ferber and Tomerius, 2003, p.126). 
 
This comprehensive and sustainable strategy for development has made it important not 
only in Europe and the United States, but also in other developing countries that are 
going through industrialization and modernization.  
 
In China, cities are experiencing a shift in their economic structure, from traditional 
manufacturing to service and skill-intensive manufacturing. This transition leaves behind 
underused or abandoned industrial sites in central cities and/or peripheral regions. Due to 
several decades’ of industrial activity on these sites, they normally contain hazardous 
materials that pose risk to human health and the environment. Moreover, rapid 
urbanization in China has resulted in a need to transform land uses of former industrial 
sites in central cities. The ecological, economic and social issues associated with 






Even though many cities in China have been and are practicing redevelopment of former 
industrial sites, and both the central and local governments have begun to take actions to 
control and remediate land contamination, a comprehensive and effective legal and 
regulatory framework for brownfield remediation and redevelopment has not been 
established. Meanwhile, uniform national standards on site assessment, clean-up and 
remediation and effective funding or financing mechanisms are lacking from national 
level to local levels. The purpose of this study is to examine policy tools that are being 
adopted in China to deal with brownfield remediation and redevelopment, compare them 
to those employed in the United States, make recommendations to improve existing 




The brownfield issue is complicated and extensive in virtually every industrialized nation 
because of the gradual, but steady, migration of industries from the city to greenfield 
areas since the mid-1970s, leaving many large cities with innumerable underutilized or 
vacant industrial sites (De Sousa, 2000). However, the problem happens not only in 
developed countries. In China, idled or abandoned industrial sites and associated land 







Brownfields in China can date back to 1950s, the beginning of highly polluting industries 
built during the Great Leap Forward1. Most of these industrial factories were owned by 
the state, and initially located on the perimeter of cities for locational advantages. Towns 
and cities were gradually developed around these sites along with the expansion of 
population, economic activities and land consumption. Due to the industrial restructuring 
and relocation, environmental concerns from the public, and changing economic 
environment, industrial companies, usually large state-owned enterprises, have either shut 
down or moved to suburban or rural areas leaving abandoned or under-utilized sites (Liu, 
2007). It is reported in National Land Development and Consolidation Planning (2001-
2003) (Ministry of Land and Resources, 2003) that as much as 4 million hectares of the 
land area are abandoned or idled because of previous industrial activities.  
 
These abandoned sites are potentially valuable because they are often located in the core 
sections of cities, and are generally believed to have the potential to generate great profits 
for urban redevelopment and renewal by private developers and investors. In recent 
years, rapid urban development and a red-hot real estate market in China have intensified 
the land tension in urban areas such that there is a shortage of land supply, compared to 
the huge demand. It has driven local governments and private developers to bring 
brownfields in urban cores back to redevelopment (Liu, 2011; Xie and Li, 2012). It partly 
                                                1 The Great Leap Forward was an economic and social campaign from 1958 to 1961 in China, 
which aimed to rapidly transform the country from an agrarian economy into a 
modern communist society through the process of rapid industrialization and collectivization. In 
this movement, steel manufacturing was targeted as the major industry, and goal to surpass the 
steel production of UK within 15 years was set. Major investments in state-owned projects were 
made in 1958-60. Most of the increase came through backyard steel furnaces (Lardy, Nicholas 







explains the fact that, even though in the absence of regulatory and financial incentives 
provided by governments, brownfield redevelopment is still in rudimentary in China. 
 
On the other hand, underlying the optimistic prospective of brownfield redevelopment is 
the serious problem of land contamination. These idled and/or abandoned sites are 
suspected of being contaminated because of the activities of the previous industries and a 
long history of using antiquated equipment, poor management and inadequate 
environmental service. About 70% of the land in mining districts is polluted, and it is 
conservatively estimated that there are 10,000 to 20,000 highly polluted and risky 
industrial sites throughout the nation (Yuan and Xie, 2012)2. In some cases, the 
concentration of pollutants in the soil can be up to hundreds of times higher than 
regulations permit.  
 
Little public attention was paid to land contamination in the past due to the difficulties in 
identifying and measuring land pollution as well as soil pollution hysteresis (the effects 
of pollution experienced with a lagged effect, or delay in time) (Yuan and Xie, 2012). 
However, a series of land contamination incidents has brought people’s attention to the 
grave risks to human health and environments. An example is the Sanjiang Housing 
Development Project in Wuhan, China. In 2006, an 18.7 hectare (280mu) parcel of land 
in Wuhan, which was previously used by Hanyang Pesticide Factory, was sold to 
Sanjiang Real Estate for residential development. Shortly after construction began, the 
soil was found to contain large amounts of pesticide residuals. “Several construction 
                                                2 Overall official statistics regarding contaminated land are not available. All statistics referred 






workers were poisoned and had to be hospitalized. The vendor, Wuhan Land Reserve 
Center, had to compensate 120 million RMB to Sanjiang Real Estate as it had failed to 
perform an adequate site assessment and information disclosure before the transaction, 
and the Land Reserve Center withhold the information that” (Times Weekly, 2010, 
http://time-weekly.com/story/2010-03-03/105985.html).  
 
After being reported by the media, these incidents have caught the public’s attention and 
called for the government to identify, measure and remediate contaminated sites. Since 
2006, the MEP and the MLR have jointly carried out a national to establish an inventory 
of contaminated sites. The results of this investigation are currently unavailable to the 
public3. Another important provision issued by State Environmental Protection 
Administration (SEPA, now MEP) in 2004 is Notice on Effective Pollution for Industrial 
Enterprise Relocations, which requires that “all local environmental protection bureaus 
satisfactorily carry out pollution prevention and control during the relocation process. As 
soon as a case of soil pollution is found, it should immediately be reported to SEPA, and 
pollution control countermeasures must be implemented” (Yuan and Xie, 2012, 
http://www.infzm.com/content/83855). 
 
Local governments also made efforts in contaminated sites remediation. For example,  
Shanghai issued soil cleanup standards for the Shanghai World Expo 2010 site, which 
was the first attempt in China. In 2007, Beijing’s Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) 
issued Guidelines on Site Environment Assessment (SEA), and Notice on SEA of 
                                                
3 This investigation has complete in 2010, however, the MEP has refused to make public for the 






Industrial Wasteland after Relocation. Shanxi Provincial government and Ministry of 
Land and Resources jointly launched Innovative Land Resource Management Initiative, 
which will be discussed later. Shanxi Provincial Government set up block and categorical 
grants for contaminated industrial site remediation. 
 
Even though both central and local governments have taken actions to control land 
contamination, and remediate and reuse polluted lands for the purpose of urban 
development, there are regulatory and institutional obstacles and barriers in the process of 
brownfield redevelopment. A study of brownfield remediation and redevelopment issues 
in China, which was conducted by the Sustainable Development Department of the East 
Asia and Pacific Region of the World Bank, outlined the issues that, 
 
, the nation is lacking in many areas: a comprehensive regulatory framework (including 
both ex-ante and ex-post liability and risks for brownfield sites); uniform national 
standards on site assessment, clean-up and remediation; proven technologies for 
investigating and remediating contaminated sites; and effective funding or financing 
mechanisms. China also needs to improve its information disclosure on brownfield sites 
and strengthen its national and local capacity and the participation of stakeholders (Xie 
and Li, 2010). 
 
The institutional and regulatory issues have become barriers in the process of brownfield 
remediation and redevelopment.  
 
1.3 Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study is to examine policy tools that are being adopted in China to 
deal with brownfield remediation and redevelopment, provide an overview of legal and 






United States, compare policy tools to those employed in the United States, and make 
relevant recommendations to improve and coordinate existing programs into an integrate 
legal and regulatory framework in China.  
 
Brownfield remediation and redevelopment is a broad topic that covers a wide range of 
regulatory, scientific, technological, financial and political aspects, and involves various 
stakeholders, such as governments, private developers and PRPs (Primary Responsible 
Parties). The scope of this study, however, will only cover regulatory, institutional, and 
financial aspects. 
 
The study also covers a case of a brownfield redevelopment project in Yangquan, Shanxi, 
China, which was a multi-land use redevelopment of 146.6-acres that had been the site of 
a state-owned steel factory. The process involved in the redevelopment is examined to 
identify what policy tools were employed. Interviews with local officials were conducted 
to examine how the project was accommodated in the absence of a comprehensive and 
effective legal and regulatory framework. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
The present study consists of three parts, (1) an overview and a comparative analysis of 
regulatory framework toward brownfield remediation and redevelopment in the United 
States, (2) policy tools that are adopted in China and associated regulatory, institutional 
and financial issues toward brownfield remediation and redevelopment, and (3) a case 






to provide an overview of current brownfield remediation and redevelopment situation in 
China, and to understand the complexity and deficiencies of existing legal and regulatory 
framework. The specific questions that were addressed in the study are: 
 
• What programs and policy tools related to brownfield remediation and 
redevelopment are currently adopted and employed in China? 
 
• How is the brownfield remediation and redevelopment project accommodated in 
the local level in the absence of a comprehensive and effective legal and 
regulatory framework?  
 
• What improvements and efforts should be made by the central government based 


















2.1 Literature Review 
The literature review will first address comparative studies of policy-making activities 
within the US, Europe and other countries, with emphasis on policy tools and regulatory 
framework toward brownfield remediation and redevelopment in the US. The second 
section will focus on research studies about key obstacles to remediation and 
redevelopment, and policy-making activities to overcome those obstacles.  
 
The review of policies tools and legal and regulatory framework of the US has generated 
a substantial research literature in the United States (Meyer et al. 1995, Page 1997, De 
Sousa 2000, Bian & Wang 2008, Gong 2010). Meyer et al. (1995) found great variability 
between the policy-making practices in effect in the US and those in most European 
countries, where they claimed that the management of contaminated sites has tended to 
be more “corporatist” given that member states tend to accept primary responsibility for 
cleanup and redevelopment. On the other hand, in the U.S. such management tends to be 
more “individualistic,” whereby cleanup and redevelopment is held to be the 
responsibility of the private sector, with governments playing a purely regulatory role by 
setting environmental and cleanup standards. However, De Sousa (2000) argued that the 
gap in the approaches being taken currently in the U.S. and Europe seems to be closing, 
as policy-making converges in both style and content. From the comparison of how 






key obstacles to remediation and redevelopment, he pointed out that although there is still 
some variability in policy-making style within Canada and elsewhere, the degree of 
variability is starting to diminish. He also argued that this convergence trend is due, in 
large part, to the fact that governments in the US and Europe are implementing similar 
policies and programs to share a greater portion of the costs and risks involved in 
redevelopment and remediation with the private sector. 
 
There exists a substantial research literature on brownfields remediation and 
redevelopment by Chinese researchers (Liu 2007, Chang & Feng 2008, Liu & Yu 2009, 
Zhang & Li 2010Xie & Li 2010, Gong 2010). However, diverse in their objectives, quite 
a large amount has been focused on scientific/technical issues and transformation of land 
uses. Very few of them delved into regulatory and institutional issues, or policy-making 
activities towards contaminated site remediation and redevelopment. Generally, 
researchers have criticized China’s policy-making activities as incomprehensive, 
fragmented, and lagged behind.  
 
Xie and Li (2010) pointed out that China is lacking in many areas: a comprehensive 
regulatory framework (including both ex-ante and ex-pose liability and risks for 
brownfield sites); uniform national standards on site assessment; cleanup and 
remediation; proven technologies for investigating and remediating contaminated sites; 
and effective funding or financing mechanisms. China also needs to improve its 
information disclosure on brownfield sites and strengthen its national and local capacity 






brownfield site remediation and highlighted the fragmentation of the legal framework 
throughout the nation. They also highlighted some pilot programs associated with land 
contamination control in Beijing, Shanghai and Chongqing, which indicated that in some 
Chinese cities, actions have been taken to control land contamination with innovative and 
self-initiated programs and policy-making activities. These pilot activities proved to be 
effective to deal with contaminated site remediation and redevelopment. Reciprocally, 
local decisions and strategies to restore contaminated sites can be strengthened by 
national actions to reduce regulatory barriers to reuse and to expand the availability of 
existing resources to brownfield projects (Collaton & Bartsch 1996). 
 
Xie and Li (2010) also reviewed the institutional arrangements and stakeholders (national 
and local governments, previous exploiters, local residents and potential investors) of 
brownfield site management in China. Existing legal provisions on the prevention and 
control of land pollution in China’s laws and regulations are scattered, and too general to 
specify legal responsibilities and obligations among stakeholders. A comprehensive legal 
system is desperately needed to clearly define the responsibility and liability of land 
contamination and remediation, and provide clear and concise guidance for all 
stakeholders (Liu 2007, Chang & Feng 2008). According to Greinert (2007), key 
stakeholders involved in brownfield redevelopment are generally categorized into five 
groups: (1) primary responsible party (PRP); (2) private sector; (3) federal and state 
government agencies; (4) local government; and (5) community. He also provided a 
summary of each stakeholder’s past and current behavior, and the reasons for these 






motivations, behavior, and their differing perceptions of brownfield remediation and 
redevelopment will help to establish each stakeholder’s responsibilities and cooperative 
actions in the following analysis (Greinert 2007). 
 
As for the contaminated site problems, key obstacles associated with remediation and 
redevelopment have been commonly identified in the American, the European and 
Canadian literature (European Commission 1996, NRTEE 1998s, Collaton & Bartsch 
1996, Bartsch et al. 1997, Gong 2010). De Sousa (2000) structured his comparative 
analysis with five components: (1) regulatory jurisdictional issues; (2) data sources; (3) 
cleanup criteria; (4) liability issues; and (5) funding issues, which correspond to five key 
obstacles: (1) variability in the character and application of regulations; (2) a lack of 
information on the whereabouts and conditions of contaminated sites; (3) a lack of 
standardized and practical cleanup criteria; (4) uncertainties regarding liability ensuing 
from environmental remediation; and (5) generally limited funding resources available 
for remediation and redevelopment. 
 
Policy-making on brownfield remediation and redevelopment internationally has been 
focused on overcoming these five main obstacles. Underlying these factors, which also 
explains the convergence of contaminated site policies and programs, is that policy-
makers realized that it is simply impossible for governments to remediate and redevelop 
the plethora of contaminated sites in their jurisdictions and that this massive undertaking 






realization turned the policy-making to public-private cost/risk sharing strategies 
internationally.  
 
De Sousa (2000) proposed a conceptual stage model capturing the policy-making 
evolution trend internationally: (1) Cost/Risk Encounter, (2) Cost/Risk Shuffling, (3) 
Cost/Risk Awareness, and (4) Cost/Risk Acceptance/Sharing. Characters of each stage 
are summarized in the Table 2.1. He argued that the U.S. has been in the third stage and 
is entering the fourth stage. The Brownfields Action Agenda4 (EPA, 1995) and the 
various state programs (e.g. Voluntary Cleanup Programs5), have acknowledged the 
broader environmental, social and economic scope of the problem and sought to develop 
policy tools capable of balancing public sector concerns with private sector needs and 
remediate contaminated sites affordably. Federal, state and local governments have 
started accepting responsibility and sharing costs and risks associated with contaminated 
sites.  
  
                                                4 EPA initiated the Brownfields Action Agenda in 1995 in response to the widespread economic 
development obstacles posed by urban brownfields. The agenda encouraged states, local 
government, lenders, and prospective purchasers to work together to ease fears of financial 
liability and regulatory burdens. 
(http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/laws/other_bf_related_laws.htm) 
 5 From the mid-1990s, states have created voluntary cleanup programs (VCPs) to offer liability 
relief and other incentives for responsible parties to remediate contaminated sites. EPA remains 
involved in the development and operation of state VCPs, negotiating the content of VCPs with 
state governments, signing Memoranda of Agreement with states to accept them, and setting out 









Table 2.1 A Stage Model of Convergence in Contaminated Lands Policy 
Stage 1: Cost/Risk 
Encounter 
• Initial encounter with the health and environmental 
risks posed by contaminated sites 
• Call for scientific investigation 
• Investment standstill 
• Central government takes on primary role 
Stage 2: Cost/Risk 
Shuffling 
• Shifting of regulatory responsibility between different 
levels of government 
• Shifting of costs and risks among public and private 
sectors 
• Uncertainty= minimal investment 
Stage 3: Cost/Risk 
Awareness 
• Acknowledgement of the broader environmental, social 
and economic risks of inaction 
• Improved scientific understanding of risk 
• Testing of alternative policies and programs in 
different jurisdiction 
• Increased investment 
Stage 4: Cost/Risk 
Acceptance/Sharing 
• Government acceptance and sharing of financial and 
management risks 
• Harmonization of effectiveness approaches and 
standards at all levels of government 
Source: De Sousa (2000, p.57). 
 
In addition to the brownfield redevelopment literature, Lange and McNeil (2004a, 2004b) 
reported survey data from nearly 160 brownfield stakeholders and project personnel from 
75 federal brownfield pilot projects on the attributes that contributed to success of 
brownfield redevelopments. They found that a host of characteristics related to project 
costs and timing, financing, community support, land use, infrastructure, willingness of 
lending institutions to participate in the financing, support of local politicians, availability 
of financial incentives, and number of jobs to be created appear important to the success 
of brownfields redevelopment.  
 
Governments originally required contaminated sites to be cleaned up to pristine or natural 






“polluter pays” principle. This made it extremely costly to clean sites and quite difficult 
to attract private investment to them. With regard to cost of environmental cleanup, 
Collaton and Bartsch (1996) pointed out that cleanup adds to the cost of any 
redevelopment project, and often it adds significantly. In most cases, adequate financing 
to carry out cleanup and redevelopment activities is seldom available at affordable rates, 
reaching to more than threefold since 1980. Moreover, cleanup delays project 
completion, generates extra expenses for environmental assessments and detailed 
appraisals, and calls for much time and staff work. These factors eat into the profitability 
of a project and undermine its economic viability.  
 
Gong (2010) proposed a risk-based and site prioritization strategy drawn from the 
analysis of contaminated site management framework internationally that shows full 
remediation is often excessively costly, and that the optimal level of cleanup targets 
depends on the risks the site poses to its environmental and the surrounding population, 
which in turn largely depend on the proximity of the brownfield to population centers and 
its intended use. By introducing less stringent generic criteria tied to future land use, and 
more flexible site-specific risk assessment procedures, governments could accept some 
risk by allowing some contamination to be left on site and thereby reducing private sector 
cleanup costs (De Sousa 2000).  
 
With regard to liability issue, Collaton and Bartsch (1996) claimed that uncertain 
liabilities are a key barrier that hinders private developers from obtaining financing, since 






value, and the project’s economic viability due to the high cleanup cost. China also needs 
to balance between the “polluter pays principle” and implementation efficiency, and 
clearly define responsibilities and liabilities, to avoid the lengthy and costly litigation 
(Gong, 2010). In the U.S., governments have started to share some of the costs and risks 
associated with liability (De Sousa 2000). First, many state governments in the U.S. are 
now protecting private investors from prospective liability (e.g. Covenants Not to Sue 
and No Further Action Letters6), thereby reducing the potential costs associated with re-
cleaning up a site in the future. Second, governments are no longer compelling 
landowners to cleanup low-risk sites until their property is redeveloped or sold or until it 
is economically feasible, thus allowing activity to continue on site despite risks from 
contamination (e.g. allowing a gas station with contaminated soil to operate, allowing a 
contaminated site to remain vacant until a market exists for redevelopment). 
 
With regard to funding, according to De Sousa (2000), governments in the US and 
Europe offer a variety of direct funding programs and financing incentives to encourage 
the sharing of costs and financial risks associated with remediation and redevelopment. 
The US approach and particularly the latest brownfield legislation passed in 2001 very 
much focuses on leveraging private finance, particularly through the use of specific 
                                                6 Covenants Not to Sue and No Further Action Letters are designed by state legislation to prevent 
future liability litigation if the cleanup process had to be carried out again due to changing 
standards (De Sousa, 2000).  
Covenant Not to Sue is a written promise by a state government that it will not take legal action or 
require additional cleanup by a party that satisfactorily cleans up a property under a state 
brownfield or voluntary cleanup program. No Further Action Letter is a written statement by a 
state government that it has no present intention to take legal action or require additional cleanup 
by a party that satisfactorily cleans up a property under a state brownfield or voluntary cleanup 








economic tools such as tax and financial incentives for private investors on brownfield 
sites (Ferber and Tomerius, 2003). In China, there is no an effective financial mechanism 
associated with the contaminated sites problem at the central level (Xie & Li, 2010), all 
governments, especially local governments, pass on all costs and financial risks to the 
private sector.  
 
However, even with these advantages, contaminated sites may simply be uncompetitive 
because of other, non-environmental, market-driven limitations. According to Robertson 
(1999), non-environmental factors such as site location and configuration and access to 
skilled labor typically play a far more important role than environmental liabilities in 
influencing location decisions. In the U.S., where brownfield sites have been 
redeveloped, this has often been done without public money. However, this only 
concerns those sites that are profitable to redevelop, where expected financial returns 
exceed redevelopment costs, including cleanup costs. Many others sites under current 
policies will never be reclaimed because they are too polluted and/or situated 
unfavorably. In between are the sites where public money can help and incentives matter 
(Ferber and Tomerius, 2003).  
 
2.2 Summary 
The literature review shows the trend of converging in policy-making style and content 
internationally, due to the fact that governments in the US and Europe are implementing 
similar policies and programs to share a great portion of the costs and risks involved in 






remediation and redevelopment of contaminated sites is a costly and potentially risky 
proposition. The plethora of contaminated sites can only be remediated, redeveloped and 
financed by both the public and private sectors. The literature review lays the ground for 
a comparative analysis for China and the US, since they shared commonalities in dealing 
with contaminated site problems. Given the gaps in research and policy-making related to 
brownfield remediation and redevelopment in China, it is essential to analyze the policy 
framework and policy activities of the US, and learn the experiences generated from 












3.1 Study Purpose and Rationale 
The present analysis focuses on examining policy tools that are being adopted in China to 
deal with brownfield redevelopment, and comparing them to those employed in the 
United States. Associated policy-making activities in China were categorized into five 
components: (1) regulatory jurisdictional issues; (2) data sources; (3) cleanup criteria; (4) 
liability issues; and (5) funding issues. Policy-making activities were also classified as 
national, provincial and local under the above themes. The comparison between China 
and the US was conducted under the same framework, since parallels exist between 
Chinese and US forms of state (national to federal, province to state).  
 
This qualitative research is also involved with a case study of a brownfield 
redevelopment project in Yangquan, Shanxi (see Figure 3.1), which was a multi-land use 
redevelopment of 146.6 acres that had been the site of a state-owned steel factory. The 
Yangquan Steel Company went bankrupt and closed the factory, laying off more than 
5,000 employees. After cleanup and minor improvement of the site, the land was sold by 
the government to a local private real estate developer. It now houses four huge 
commercial complexes, one public park and more than 1.6 million square meters of new 
condominiums. Interviews with local officials in Yangquan, China and a site visit were 






redevelopment project was accommodated at the local level in the absence of a 
comprehensive and effective legal and regulatory framework. 
 
Figure 3.1 Yangquan (Black) in Shanxi (Light Grey), China (White) (Source: 
Wikipedia) 
 
3.2 Study Description 
Information and data in this research were collected primarily from transcription of 
relevant literature and governmental documents, observation in the way of site visit, as 







The narrative data used for transcription, including all associated governmental policies 
and programs and basic documentations about the case, were collected, transcribed and 
categorized into five themes (regulatory jurisdictional issues, data sources, cleanup 
criteria, liability issues, and funding issues) related to the research questions. Except 
relevant literature, data was mainly collected through web-search (the official websites of 
government agencies) and in-person requests during interviews. Governmental 
documents and project proposal were obtained from Yangquan Municipal Commission of 
Development and Reform, Yangquan Municipal Land and Resources Bureau, Yangquan 
Environmental Protection Bureau, Yangquan Urban Planning Bureau, State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of Yangquan Municipal Government 
in person request. Old photographs of the site that show the steel factory before 
demolition were acquired from State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of Yangquan Municipal Government by email request as secondary data.  
 
Face-to-face interviews were conducted in Yangquan, Shanxi, the city where the research 
case is located, in order to obtain relevant local policies and programs information, assess 
the effectiveness of national and provincial policies, and more importantly to figure out in 
the absence of a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework, how these brownfield 
redevelopment projects were accommodated in the local level. Interviewees were 
administrators of five redevelopment issues related bureaus in Yangquan (see Appendix 
for a list of interviewees), who are familiar with the relevant issues and policies of the 
entire jurisdiction. The questions were designed to elicit information on (See Appendix 






associated with brownfield redevelopment from diverse levels of government and 
governmental-related agencies; (2) how the government agencies in the local level define 
and perceive the brownfield problem, and how they define their roles; (3) the kinds of 
policies and programs provided by local level governmental agencies for addressing main 
obstacles- variability in regulatory processes, lack of data sources, lack of cleanup 
standards, fear of liability, limited funding resources for cleanups; (4) issues and 
obstacles they face in the facilitation and accommodation of brownfield redevelopment 
projects. 
 
The interviews and site visit were conducted between January 8th and January 11th, 2013.  
The interviewees were met individually during their office hours at their offices. 
Researcher took notes during each interview for accuracy. Each interview lasted between 
30 and 45 minutes. Communications were in Chinese, which is the first language for both 
the researcher and interviewees. 
 
The site visit was conducted during the researcher’s stay at Yangquan. Photos that reflect 
the current conditions of the site were taken. Since the case is a multi-landuse 
redevelopment project, including residential, commercial and recreational buildings and 
open space, the visit last approximately 45 minutes to cover all kinds of physical 
structures.  
 
The research was approved by Columbia University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) 







The method to assess the effectiveness of China’s policies and programs does examine 
the actual performance of these policies on brownfield redevelopment projects, but 
compares policy-making activities to those other countries have done with similar 
constraints, thereby providing a measure of China’s progress and shortage in this area. 
Given the complexity of contaminated site problems and the enormous amount of 
regulatory activities generated by different levels of government, it is impossible to be 
exhaustive. The present analysis provides a general picture of China’s legal and 















The current situation in dealing with brownfield remediation and redevelopment of China 
was examined and compared with that of the US within the framework of how the 
following five obstacles were dealt with by both countries: (1) regulatory jurisdictional 
issues; (2) data sources; (3) cleanup criteria; (4) liability issues; and (5) funding issues. 
An introduction of institutional arrangement in China was provided at first to familiar 
readers with the policy-making actors in China. An analysis of the data yielded from the 
literature review and governmental documents and interviews with local officials 
revealed findings within the areas of the research questions: 
• What programs and policy tools related to brownfield remediation and 
redevelopment are currently adopted and employed in China? 
• How is the brownfield remediation and redevelopment project accommodated at 
the local level in the absence of a comprehensive and effective legal and 
regulatory framework?  
 
4.2 Institutional Arrangement  
In China, the management of contaminated site issues is divided among a variety of 
agencies in the national level: the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR), Ministry of 






(NDRC), and the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD). The 
following table outlines the primary responsibility of each agency involved in 
contaminated site remediation and redevelopment issues. 
Table 4.1 Relevant Central Governmental Agencies and Their Primary 
Responsibilities7 
Agencies Primary Responsibilities 
Ministry of Land and 
Resources (MLR) 
• Implement land management law or regulations 
• Conduct land surveys and statistics 
• Issue land titles and certificates  
• Develop land use master plans  
• Manage land acquisitions and allocations  
• Review and submit land use change applications that require 
State Council approval  
• Conduct researches on major land management issues  
• Supervise local land bureaus  




• Supervise and manage environmental pollution prevention 
• Develop and implement guidelines for the prevention of 




• Draft national environmental protection strategy  
• Draft national urban development strategies and policies 
• Coordinate major issues in ecological development, and 
energy and resources savings 




• Endorse city planning submitted by lower level urban 
planning bureaus and supervise their implementation  
• Participate in land use planning review 
• Develop national urban development strategies and policies  
• Draft commercial and residential real estate guidance and 
policies 
• Supervise the implementation of regulatory policies in the 
real estate market jointly with relevant agencies 
Source: Xie and Li (2000), and edited by researcher. 
 
In the U.S., that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the most important 
agency in the federal government to administer environmental policy-making; in China, 
the MLR and MEP share the primary responsibilities to manage contaminated sites. Since 
land is owned by the state, the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR), on behalf of the 
                                                7 For NDRC and MHURD, responsibilities that related to brownfield remediation and 






State Council, is responsible for the uniform management of land resources, including 
managing contaminated sites and conducting land surveys. While the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP) is responsible for managing environmental pollution 
issues, and developing and implementing regulations to prevent water, air, soil and solid 
waste pollution.  
 
Other central governmental agencies, including the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development 
(MOHURD), are also involved in brownfield remediation and redevelopment in their 
related aspects. Although there is a clear definition of each agency’s responsibilities and 
duties in dealing with contaminated site problems, there is no comprehensive regulatory 
framework to streamline each agencies’ duties, such as to what extent each agency should 
be involved into the problem and how to facilitate inter- and intra-coordination and 
cooperation between various governmental agencies. There are the problems with 
overlapping responsibilities, as well as absent responsibilities, in the management of 
contaminated site problems, due to the lack of streamlined framework, so is the problem 
in local level management. Previous practices (e.g. the industrial site remediation and 
redevelopment for the Shanghai World Expo 2010) in brownfield remediation and 
redevelopment were on a case-by-case basis and a “learning by doing” manner. 
 
The institutional arrangement at the local level is consistent with the national level. 
Above-mentioned national agencies have corresponding provincial and municipal 






policy-making powers, but they must keep them in line with national policies. In some 
cases, provincial and municipal agencies are taking more active and innovative roles in 
policy-making, since brownfield remediation and redevelopment are carried out directly 
at the local level. The innovative actions in policy-making taken by local governmental 
agencies fill the gap of policies and guidelines from the national level. 
 
Taking Beijing as an example, redevelopment of a former industrial site needs to be 
approved by four municipal agencies: the Beijing Municipal Economic and Information 
Commission (BMEIC), Municipal Development and Reform Commission (BDRC), 
Municipal Urban Planning Commission (BUPC), and the Municipal City Administration 
and Sanitation Commission (BCASC). Before 2007, Beijing Municipal Environmental 
Protection Bureau (BEPB) was not involved in this approval process. In 2007, the 
BMEPB issued Site Environment Assessment Guidelines and the Notice Regarding 
Implementation of Soil Environmental Assessment after Enterprise Relocation, which 
requires that soil assessments be conducted before the reuse of a former industrial site. 
These two documents were not mandated from the national level, but were a self-initiated 
policy-making activity from the local level to respond to the poisoning incident of 
Beijing Songjiazhuang Subway station in 20048, which marks the beginning of the 
remediation and redevelopment of industrial contaminated site in Beijing (Xie and Li, 
2010).  
                                                8 The poisoning incident happened during the construction of Songjiazhuang Metro Station in 
Beijing in 2004. The site was occupied by a pesticide plant in the 1970s. Large quantities of 
residual poisonous gases remained trapped underground after the plant was replaced. Three 
workers were poisoned when the drilling operation reached 5 meters. The Beijing Environmental 







4.3 Regulatory Jurisdictional Issues 
China has no legal and regulatory framework for contaminated site remediation and 
redevelopment. There are no special national laws and regulations for brownfield 
remediation and redevelopment similar to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (1980) and its amendments and associated programs in 
the US. Provisions related to pollution and liability issues are scattered in several existing 
national laws or regulations, such as the Constitution, Criminal Law, Environmental 
Protection Law, Land Management Law, Solid Waste Pollution Prevention Law, 
Hazardous Chemical Waste Pollution Prevention and Control Methods, Law of Water 
and Soil Conservation, Land Reclamation Ordinance, and the Urban Real Estate 
Development and Management Regulations (Xie & Li, 2010). 
 
The Constitution requires the rational use of land and the prevention of soil pollution; 
Criminal Law specifies the criminal nature of soil pollution; the Solid Waste Pollution 
Prevention Law regulates solid wastes; the Land Management Law prevents land 
desertification, soil erosion and soil pollution; and the Land Reclamation Ordinance 
requires that damage caused during construction work—including digging, excavating, 
pressing and other activities should be compensated, and the sites should be remediated. 
The Solid Waste Pollution Prevention Law requires entities that produce solid waste to 
take preventive measures, and specifies their obligation and financial liabilities. 
 
Even though these legal requirements are clearly stated, they are too general to provide 






responsibilities; liabilities and responsible parties; uniform national standards and 
procedures on site assessment, cleanup and remediation; and effective funding or 
financing mechanisms, are absent. At the moment, MEP is lobbying for passing 
legislation on soil pollution prevention and control to fill the gap and develop a specific 
law for prevention and management of land contamination. 
 
Lacking a specific law to deal with contaminated site problems, the prevention and 
management of these contaminated sites are guided by an ad-hoc series of regulations. 
Among these various regulations, three provisions are of importance: Notices on 
Effective Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution for Industrial Enterprise 
Relocations (MEP, 2004), Recommendations on Strengthening Soil Contamination 
Prevention and Remediation (MEP, 2008), and Management Method of Contaminated 
Sites (MEP, not issued yet).   
 
The 2004 notice from MEP is not a mandatory provision. It marks the beginning of 
recognition of the contaminated site management issues in the relocation of industrial 
enterprises. The Recommendations on Strengthening Soil Contamination Prevention and 
Remediation (MEP, 2008) further set out a series of working targets to be accomplished 
by 2015 to establish a preliminary framework for managing and controlling land 
contamination. It pointed out the severe problems associated with soil pollution, specified 
government goals, laid out a working plan to establish regulatory framework, and called 
for action. The proposed actions include completing the national survey of soil 






Network, developing national and local soil pollution prevention plans, and forming a 
preliminary regulatory and policy framework for the prevention of soil pollution. 
However, the impact of this provision is limited since it lacks the legally enforcement of 
a national law to effectively implement and realize its goals. 
 
Another attempt by MEP is the Management Method of Contaminated Sites to be 
published soon. It’s specific to contaminated site problems and is supposed to provide 
more detail in defining operational procedures and technical issues. It tries to set up a 
regulatory framework of site investigation and environmental risk assessment. According 
to Xie and Li (2010), it will provide guidelines under which the investigation and 
assessment of conditions must be carried out, what content of assessment should be 
included and what procedures should be followed. This document is expected to 
significantly contribute to establish a comprehensive regulatory framework towards 
brownfield remediation. 
 
As a comparison, the Comprehensive Environmental Response and Liabilities Act 
(CERCLA 1980), commonly referred to as Superfund, was the most important legal 
framework issued in the U.S. The law made provisions for a specific remediation fund, 
and it gave state governments and the federal Environmental Protection Agency strong 
regulatory powers. Later, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (1986) 
broadened the federal EPA’s mandate to include research and remediation activities. 






Conservation and Recovery Act (1974, 1984), which governs the management of non-
hazardous waste, hazardous waste and underground storage tanks. 
 
In 1995, the EPA introduced the Brownfields Action Agenda to address the inefficiencies 
of Superfund and led to an increase in brownfield redevelopment in the US. This agenda 
further clarifies the institutional responsibilities to assign liability, provides funds for 
pilot programs to test redevelopment models, and limits the EPA’s activities to the 
management of the high-risk contaminated sites (Johnson, 1996).  
 
Even without a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework in the national level, 
some provinces and municipalities with faster development pace, such as Beijing, 
Shanghai and Chongqing, have made efforts to formulate polices and strategic actions to 
deal with brownfield remediation and redevelopment. In the absence of operational 
guidelines from national agencies, some innovative provincial and municipal 
governments took innovative actions to deal with contaminated site problems. Table 2.2 
outlines some actions, guidelines and regulations initiated by some local governments. 
These policy-making activities are consistent with national policies, and some of these 








Taking Beijing as an example, the city has established an initial regulatory framework for 
environmental assessment and management planning for sites vacated by relocated 
industries in response to the poisoning incident of Songjiazhuang Subway Station in 
2004. Following the incident, a series of local regulations and administrative rules were 
issued. Among these, two brownfield management documents, Site Environmental 
Assessment Guideline (2007) and Notice on Implementing Soil Environmental 
Assessment for Sites Left from Industry Relocation (2007), are of great importance. 
Significant progress has been made relative to other municipalities in China.  
 
Table 2.2 Relevant Actions, Policies and Guidelines in the Local Governments 
Beijing • Site Environment Assessment Guideline ( Municipal EPB, 2007) 
• Notice on Implementing Soil Environmental Assessment for Sites 
Left from Industry Relocation ( Municipal EPB, 2007) 
Shanghai • Soil cleanup standards for the Shanghai World Expo 2010  
Chongqing • Methodology on Soil Contamination Prevention and Remediation (at 
drafting stage, not yet issued) 
• Chongqing City Environmental Protection Regulations (City People’s 
Congress, 2007) 
• Notification on Strengthening the Remediation of Contaminated 
Former Industrial Sites (Municipal Government, 2008) 
• Forwarding SEPA Notification on Implementing Pollution Control 
during Factory Relocation (Municipal EPB, 2004) 
• Notification on Implementing Soil Contamination Control and 
Treatment after Factory Relocation (Municipal EPB, 2005) 
• Notification on Strengthening the Management of Solid Waste Left 
from Closed, Shut-down, Bankrupt and Relocated Factories 
(Municipal EPB, 2006) 
• Request for Further Regulating and Strengthening the Supervision of 
Contaminated Sites Left from Closed, Stopped, Bankrupted and 
Relocated Factories (Municipal EPB, 2008) 
Zhejiang 
Province 
• Management Framework on Land Contamination Prevention and 
Remediation (at drafting stage) 
Shenyang  • Administrative Methods for Cleanup and Remediation of 
Contaminated Lands in Shenyang (for trial use) (Municipal EPB, 
Planning Bureau, and Land and Resources Bureau) 






The Site Environmental Assessment Guidelines provides a procedure for site 
environmental assessment that aims to identify contaminated sites, conduct risk 
assessments based on current or proposed future land uses, determine remediation criteria 
and propose proper remediation methods. The following table provides a detailed 
description of this procedure (Beijing EPB, 2007). 
Table 2.3 General Procedure of Site Environmental Assessment  
Step 1  
Contamination 
Identification: 
Identify potential contaminated sites using inventory review, 
field visits and interviews with landowners, operators and 
other related agencies.  




Carry out preliminary soil and groundwater sampling and 
laboratorial analysis to verify the type and level of site 
contamination, and risks posed to human health and 
environment.  
Step 3 
Risk Assessment and 
Remediation Plans: 
Conduct a risk assessment and develop soil cleanup and 
remediation plans. Proposed future land uses, such as 
residential, agricultural, industrial and commercial purposes, 
need to be taken into account in this risk assessment.  
Source: Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau. 
 
The Notice on Implementing Soil Environmental Assessment for Sites Left from Industry 
Relocation reinforces the Site Environmental Assessment Guidelines presented above, 
and is more specific to redevelopment activities. It stipulates that, prior to redevelopment, 
a risk assessment must be conducted, remediation plan must be prepared, and remediation 
must be conducted to reach the environmental targets set by the plan. It also reiterates the 
“polluter pays” principle that remediation costs of the contaminated sites should be paid 
by the responsible parties that caused the pollution. However, the framework in Beijing 
needs to further be enriched to identify responsible parties and develop incentives and 







Another municipality that has established a regulatory framework for brownfield 
remediation is Chongqing. To fulfill its target to relocate old and polluting industries 
from central urban areas for environmental concerns and urban development, Chongqing 
has introduced various policies and regulations, clarified institutional responsibilities, and 
conducted pilot projects. Different from the situation in Beijing, Chongqing has 
established a specialized fund for contaminated site remediation, which will be discussed 
later (Chongqing EPB, 2010). However, Chongqing still lacks guidelines to stipulate risk 
assessment procedures and cleanup criteria as Beijing’s effort.  
 
In the U.S., within the CERCLA framework, individual state administrations are assigned 
responsibility for enacting and implementing their own contaminated site legislation. 
Besides remediation and redevelopment legislations, over 45 individual states have now 
implemented so-called Voluntary Cleanup Programs (VCPs) to loosen the stringent 
cleanup standards that federal and state Superfund-style legislation imposed. They 
developed remediation and redevelopment policies that offer more flexible cleanup 
options, give the private sector discretion to cleanup contaminated sites, and provide 
technical assistance, financial support, and protection from liability (De Sousa, 2000).  
 
4.4 Data Sources 
The lack of a systematic, nation-wide approach to collecting, storing and disseminating 
information on both the whereabouts of contaminated sites and on the extent of the 
environmental problem in China is also considered to be an important obstacle inhibiting 






level, there is no existing inventory of contaminated sites, or related inventories. 
However, such information is needed to aid in the identification of brownfield sites and 
formulation of remediation and redevelopment policies. 
 
In 2006, the Ministry of Environment Protection and the Ministry of Land and Resources 
made an attempt to jointly carry out a national survey for identifying and classifying 
contaminated sites, primarily on farmlands, to establish an inventory of contaminated 
sites (not yet finished). This investigation has been completed in 2010, and is at the stage 
of data processing and analyzing. This survey aimed to establish an inventory of 
contaminated sites, identify the type, scope, extent and spatial distribution of heavily 
polluted areas, analyze the causes of pollution, and propose environmental management 
measures. The geographical scope of this national survey covers most provinces and 
municipalities in China, focusing on the Yangtze River Delta, the Pearl River Delta, the 
Bohai Bay Economic Belt, and the old North East China industrial belt (Xie and Li, 2010, 
Yuan and Xie, 2012). However, the survey findings are not available to the public that it 
is doubtful that this effort will be practically put in use in the brownfield remediation and 
redevelopment activities.  
 
According to the interviewee from Yangquan Land and Resources Bureau, they are 
conducting a survey on industrial contaminated sites to establish an inventory, in 
response to a provincial program that plans to redevelop those abandoned and/or under 
utilized industrial sites. This survey aims at contaminated sites that resulted from 






detailed information, such as location, type and extent of contamination. It is also not 
clear if they will share the information and cooperate with local Environmental Protection 
Bureau to draft remediation methods in the future. 
 
In the US, a tiered system exists that different levels of government compile and manage 
different kinds of contaminated site information in a practical manner. EPA’s 
computerized inventory system (CERCLIS) collects contaminated sites information for 
those deemed to pose the greatest risk to human health and the environment. These sites 
that exceed a designated hazardous ranking are put on the National Priorities List, while 
those that do not are assigned instead to state inventories. Many state and local 
governments (some used funds provided by the Brownfields Action Agenda) have 
developed their own approaches for classifying sites based on their hazard and/or 
economic development potential to better target technical assistance and government 
funds and attract private investment (De Sousa, 2000). 
 
4.5 Cleanup Criteria 
In China, there are no uniformed standards and procedures for both environmental risk 
assessment and cleanup activities on soil pollution, and technical guidelines on soil 
remediation, officially issued on the national level. Related technical standards associated 
with contaminated sites are scattered into several governmental documents prepared by 
different ministries (Xie and Li, 2010), such as: 
• Soil Environmental Monitoring Technical Specifications (HJ/T166-2004);  






• Water Environment Monitoring Specifications (SL219-98) issued by the Ministry 
of Water Resources;  
• Groundwater Quality Standards (GB/T14848-93);  
• Soil Environmental Quality Standards (GB15618-1995);  
• and Soil Environmental Quality of Industrial Enterprises (HJ/T25-1999), although 
the latter is very rarely used. 
 
MEP has been working with research institutes to draft and revise a series of 
contaminated site management standards and guidelines, including the Soil 
Environmental Quality Standard (2009), Interim Measures for Soil Environmental 
Management of Contaminated Sites (2009), Guidelines for Contaminated Sites 
Environmental Monitoring (2010), Guidelines for Contaminated Site Risk Assessment 
(2009) and Guidelines for Contaminated Site Soil Remediation (2009). According to the 
interviewee from EPB, Yangquan, contaminated sites that proposed to be redeveloped are 
required to be cleaned up to “pristine conditions”. Based on international experience, this 
cleanup criteria is stringent and causes infeasible costs for responsible parties. And it 
provides no detailed technical guidelines to remediate. However, it is not sure if site-
specific risk assessment will be introduced into these above-mentioned regulations 
prepared by MEP. Moreover, since at the moment there is no specific contamination site 
legislation in China, cleanup criteria and risk assessment/management guidelines that will 
be issued in the future are not in the form of legally-binding standards, that provinces and 







Since provincial and municipal governments are directly involved in contaminated site 
management and remediation, they are responsible for developing both their own generic 
cleanup criteria and site-specific risk assessment approach. Some provinces and 
municipalities with faster development pace and stronger economic capacities have been 
working on their own regulations and technical standards, in response to the need for soil 
pollution management and remediation. The following are a few examples: 
• Soil Environmental Quality Assessment and Remediation Standards for 
Exhibition Site (Provisional for Shanghai Expo)”  
• Site Environmental Assessment Guidelines (2007), which stipulate work 
procedures and technical methods for site environmental assessments in Beijing. 
• Shenyang Municipal Environmental Management Measures on Contaminated Site 
Treatment and Remediation (trial implementation) (2007), by Shenyang 
Municipal Planning Bureau, and Shenyang Municipal Land Resources Bureau, 
stipulates the evaluation and identification of contaminated sites. 
 
With regard to remediation techniques, even thought there are various soil and 
groundwater remediation techniques for contaminated sites, only a few are commonly 
used for practical and economical reasons. According to the interviewee from 
Environmental Protection Bureau, Yangquan, the most commonly used remediation 
techniques are predominantly off-site disposal technologies, such as excavation follow by 
depositing contaminated soil in an off-site landfill, and co-incineration in cement kilns. 
Some pilot projects utilizing other technologies for soil remediation and land reuse have 






research institutes. These pilot projects are distributed in those provinces and 
municipalities with self-initiative brownfield remediation and redevelopment regulatory 
frameworks, such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Chongqing. 
 
Recalling international experience, two types of criteria for evaluating the extent of soil 
pollution and formulating cleanup goals that protect public health and safety are currently 
being used (De Sousa, 2000, p.31): 
• “Generic numeric soil quality criteria: There are numerical indices that can be 
used for both assessment and cleanup activities derived from (eco) toxicological 
studies that identify levels according to a tolerance health risk. These indices vary 
according to the proposed land use for the contaminated site. 
• Site-specific risk assessment/risk management: These are procedures for 
developing soil and groundwater criteria that consider tolerance and risk levels 
associated with a specific site”. 
 
Internationally, this same generic cleanup criteria and site-specific procedures for 
assessing soil pollution levels and for identifying cleanup levels are used in many 
countries, which helps take into account each site’s characteristics, and control the 
effectiveness and the expense for the cleanup procedures. For example, in the US, the 
Risk Based Corrective Action approach developed by the American Society for Testing 
and Materials (ASTM), which incorporate these two types of criteria, is used as a 






4.6 Liability Issues 
In China, the liability issues associated with contaminated sites accord with the “polluter 
pays” principle, which stipulates that the person responsible for polluting the site pays to 
have it cleaned up. This principle was of great importance in framing contaminated site 
remediation policy, and was encompassed by local governments in their policy-making 
activities. For example, Chongqing municipal government has clarified the three 
principles regarding liability for brownfield management (Chongqing EPB, 2010), based 
on national laws: 
• “Polluter Pays” principle; 
• “Investor Benefits” principle 
• and “Land Owner Takes Responsibility” Principle. 
However, as for imposing liability and enforcing to recover remediation costs from 
responsible parties, there is great variability at the local level.  
 
According to the interviewee from EPB, Yangquan, contaminated sites that proposed to 
be redeveloped are required to be cleaned up to “pristine conditions” at a cost paid by 
responsible polluters. However, in actual cases, governmental agencies are reluctant to 
impose liability on responsible parties for contamination, except when the contamination 
at a site imposes a severe risk to human health or to the environment. They typically 
allow responsible parties to clean up sites voluntarily without strict risk assessment, 
supervision and post-evaluation, especially for those state-owned industrial enterprises 
that are occupying the land. In the case of transferring and redeveloping a former 






parties (e.g. former enterprises that are bankrupted, closed, or restructured), the 
government typically intervene in these matters to negotiate with potential developers to 
recover the remediation costs from land transfers. For example, in the case of the 
Hongshi Paint Plant site cleanup and redevelopment project in Beijing9, the developer 
paid for the cleanup costs as part of land transfer expenditures. According to the 
interviewee, the recovery of soil remediation costs from high land transfer revenue is 
commonly used in the local level, and is proved to be viable and practical since it’s 
unable to recover cleanup costs from unclear responsible parties. 
 
When the contamination at a site imposes a severe risk to human health or to the 
environment and arouses public awareness, local governments typical intervene to take 
remediation actions and pay for the cleanup cost. For instance, the poisoning incident 
happened during the construction of Songjiazhuang Metro Station in Beijing in 2004, the 
polluter, pesticide plant in the 1970s, has closed years ago. The Beijing Environmental 
Protection Bureau took the responsibility to remediate. Due to a lack of adequate 
legislation, liability issues associated with brownfield remediation and redevelopment, 
such as how the liability should be imposed/assigned, should there be protection against 
liability after a site has been remediated to the standards of the day, are still not on the 
table to discuss. 
 
                                                9 The site of Beijng Hongshi Paint Plant once was a pesticide plant in the 1950s, which was 
transformed into a paint plant in the 1980s. Site assessment results indicated that the soil is 
contaminated. The bidding document of the land auction specified that the winning bidder should 
implement site cleanup in accordance with the contaminated soil disposal plan formulated by 
BEPB. Finally, the private developer spent tens of millions RMB of private capital on soil 







In the US, the “polluter pays” principle is applied retroactively and the joint and several 
system is employed under Superfund legislation to charge those responsible parties for 
contamination. However, the stringent principle has given rise to a high amount of 
litigation. Under the Brownfields Action Agenda, the EPA has made a genuine effort to 
address the liability issue. Under the Voluntary Cleanup Programs established in the early 
1990s, individual states intervene only to compel parties to clean up a site when it is 
deemed to be hazardous to public health and safety. Otherwise cleanup activity is largely 
voluntary. Moreover, the states have No-Further Action and Covenants Not to Sue 
certificates to prevent future liability litigation if the cleanup process has to be carried out 
again due to changing standards (Bartsch 1997).  
 
4.7 Funding Issues 
There is currently no formal national governmental program for funding remediation or 
redevelopment projects. There are various funding programs for developing effective 
contaminated site remediation technologies, which are generally provided to research 
institutes, as well as funding programs for the national survey for identifying, assessing 
and establishing contaminated sites inventories. However, several provinces and 
municipalities have designated funds for contaminated site remediation. The municipal 
government of Chongqing has provided a specialized subsidy fund for contaminated site 
environmental risk assessment, which has been significantly increased during the past 
years. In 2007, 200 million RMB was spent on 15 projects, while by 2009 the figures 
rose to 800 million RMB spent on 45 sites (Xie and Li, 2010). Moreover, Chongqing also 






consist of a revolving fund to finance cleanup and redevelopment activities of enterprises, 
and an earmarked fund to provide grants for the cleanup and remediation of contaminated 
land with unclear responsible parties (see Table 2.4). 
Table 2.4 Potential Financial Resources for Brownfield Remediation in 
Chongqing 
Revolving fund for contaminated sites cleanup and redevelopment of enterprises 
• Establish fund to finance the relocation of polluting enterprises 
• Provide loans to the relocated enterprises for contaminated sites remediation 
• Repay the loans with revenues from remediated land transfers  
Earmarked fund to subsidize brownfield remediation 
• Establish Fund with a proportion of remediated land transfer fees (coordinate with the 
Finance Bureau, Land and Resources Bureau) 
• Prepare operational manual of the fund with the Land and Resources Bureau 
• Provide subsidies for the cleanup and remediation of contaminated sites with unclear 
responsible parties, which are not intended for development in the short term or will be 
used for public purposes. 
Source: Chongqing Environmental Protection Bureau. 
 
There are currently no incentive mechanisms in place throughout the country for 
attracting private investment in brownfield remediation and redevelopment (i.e. tax 
incentives, tax incremented financing, etc.) An interviewee from Yangquan Urban 
Planning Bureau argued that, at the moment, developable land is in a short supply so that 
private investors are competitive and enthusiastic to acquire brownfields to for 
commercial use, even if they are aware of that they may have to bear a large amount of 
cleanup costs.  
 
In the area of funding, the situation in the US is vastly different from that in China, in that 
all levels of government provide a variety of funding sources and financial incentives to 
support remediation and redevelopment activities. In addition to Superfund, the EPA 
currently provides a variety of funding sources, such as: the Brownfield Assessment 






Agenda, which makes available $300 million and an additional $165 million in loan 
guarantees to encourage partnerships among stakeholders; the Brownfields Tax 
Incentives, which allows developers to deduct the costs of cleanup from their taxes; and 
the Brownfield Cleanup Revolving Loan Fund Pilots, which provides a $350,000 
maximum loan to encourage the cleanup and reuse of brownfields. Moreover, by 1998 
twenty-six states provided some form of brownfield remediation funding (grants for 
cleanup, revolving loan funds, etc.), and specific incentives for attracting private 
investment (tax credits/abatement, tax increment financing etc.) (Bartsch, 1998).  
 
4.8 Case Study 
The mixed used project in this case was 146 acres in size and located on the riverfront of 
Yangquan, Shanxi. Formerly, the site was occupied by Yangquan Steel Corporation from 
its foundation on 1917. The total project cost about 2.1 billion RMB to complete. Of that, 
about 0.38 billion RMB was spent for land acquisition, displacement compensation and 
site improvements. The project had extraordinary value due to its prime location between 
the central business district and newly developed urban area. Moreover, It had an 
excellent location with hills on the back and river at the front. Today, the site consists of 
3,432,000 square feet of condominiums and apartments, 2,343,000 square feet of retail 
and commercial space, 971,000 square feet of hotel and office space, and ample open and 












Figure 4.1 Master Plan of Jinlian Real Estate Development Project (Source: 






Formerly, the site was used by Yangquan Steel Corporation, which was a state-owned 
steel company founded in 1917, and filed to bankruptcy in 1999. Initially, the site was on 
the peripheral of the city (see Figure 4.2). After decades of urban development, the site 
gradually became the core section of Yangquan, since it was surrounded by a newly 
development urban area. Intensified by the shortage of land supply and rapid urban 
development in Yangquan, transforming this site into a mixed-use community and 
revitalizing the city’s riverfront became the primary economic development goal of local 
government. According to the interviewee from Urban Planning Bureau, it was planned 
to move the steel company to a rural area and redevelop the site as the city’s sub-
commercial district. After the bankruptcy of Yangquan Steel Corporation, the site was 
sold to Yangquan Jinlian Real Estate Development Company through an auction at a 
price of 0.26 billion RMB in 2004. 
   
Figure 4.2 Photographs of Yangquan Steel Corporation (Source: State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of Yangquan Municipal Government) 
 
Today, the site has been totally transformed into a gleaming district with plenty of high 
quality apartments, vibrant commercial and retail stores, and abundant open space, which 
has made the site the new and prosperous urban core of Yangquan (see Figure 4.3). This 






business opportunities for transforming the city’s industrial-based economy to service-
based one. However, this project was not a strictly brownfield remediation and 
redevelopment project since that the interview from Environmental Protection Bureau 
confirmed that EPA was not involved in this project. No environmental assessment and 
cleanup was conducted during the land transfer and after redevelopment, which was also 
confirmed by interviewees from both Urban Planning Bureau and Land and Resource 
Bureau.  
    
Figure 4.3 Current Site (Source: Researcher) 
 
According to the interviewee from Urban Planning Bureau, the previously occupied land 
should have been cleaned up to pristine condition before the land auction. However, in 
this project, since the previous landowner had filed for bankruptcy. It was unable to pay 
off any demolition and site cleanup costs, and local government negotiated with the 
developer to reach out an agreement that the developer paid an upfront fee to demolish 
and cleanup the site. Moreover, local government recovered the displacement 
compensation for laid-off workers of the steel company from the high land transfer 
revenue. The interviewee acknowledged that local government is generally unwilling to 






subsidy certain sites that are too polluted and/or situated unfavorably, available tools are 
scarce at the local level, such as administrative fee exemptions.  
 
Then what made this project work? Factors that pushed the project forward included the 
strong political support and the marketability of the site. Mid- and small-size cities 
generally have more difficulties attracting investment, redeveloping brownfield, 
sustaining small businesses and restructuring economy. This project received strong 
political support since it was linked to long-term growth plans in the city, and was 
deemed to be a milestone to connect the old and new developed areas and revitalize the 
city’s riverfront. Local government provided a series of supports, such as direct 
investment on public infrastructure and facilities, and convenience on approval process. 
Meanwhile, location and market were critical factors to attract private investment to this 
project, which guaranteed the success of this project and attracted developer to share the 
cleanup cost with local government. 
 
However, another remediation effort made by Environmental Protection Bureau should 
be mentioned. Almost 80 years of production activities of Yangquan Steel Corporation 
had accumulated large amount of solid residues. These residues were deposited off the 
factory site on a suburban site (today, this site is the core section of Yangquan’s newly 
developed district). The landfill covered an area of 110,000 square meters, and had 
mounted to a height of 63 meters. In 2000, local government proposed to remediate this 
landfill since newly developed district had encompassed this site and it posed potential 






plan and took the actions of solid waste solidification and earth-sheltered plantation. A 
civic park was built on this site. One interviewee said that a provincial funding source10 
provided a 5 million RMB grant for the remediation, while local government provided 
the almost total 0.12 billion RMB for cleanup, remediation, site improvement and 
construction. According to the interviewee, the previous polluter had closed so that the 
government was unable to recover the remediation cost. Moreover, local government was 
willing to invest in this project because it was deemed a priority to remediate this 
contaminated site and provide public open space to local residents by politicians.  
 
The case project was started in 2004 when the contaminated site problem had not yet 
attracted the attention of local government. At the moment, Shanxi has been working on a 
series of policies and programs to tackle the issue. Shanxi has been a prominently 
resource-based province and specializes in coal extraction industry. Its over-reliance on 
extraction and associated processing industries has resulted heavy environmental 
deterioration. In 2010, Shanxi was approved by the State Council to set up as a national 
resource-based comprehensive economy reform pilot region (National Development and 
Reform Commission, 2012).  In the same year, Shanxi Provincial government and 
Ministry of Land and Resources jointly launched Innovative Land Resource Management 
Initiative to correspond to this pilot program.  
 
                                                10 This grant is initiated by Shanxi Provincial Government to allocate channel funds to 
contamination remediation and prevention. Eligible projects should either be municipals’ priority 
remediation and prevention projects or have attracted certain amounts of capital investments 






Both programs recognize the remediation and redevelopment of contaminated industrial 
sites as an economic development opportunity and long-term urban plans to address the 
shortage of land supply. The goals are to mobilize as many land resources as possible to 
fulfill the urban development needs and remediate the industrial contamination 
accumulated by decades of heavy industrial activities. These two programs set out a 
series of working targets to establish a preliminary framework for managing and 
revitalizing abandoned and/or underutilized industrial sites. Proposed actions include 
complete industrial site inventory, improve industrial site consolidation, relief 
redeveloped sites from strict annually national and provincial developable land quota, 
establish environmental assessment mechanism and remediation plans, and associated 
funding mechanism. According to the interviewee from Land and Resource Bureau, they 
are conducting a survey on industrial contaminated sites to establish an inventory, in 
response to these two programs. He acknowledged that local governments and investors 
are attracted to these programs because it provides a way to obtain developable land 
quota through conducting feasibility study and paying for required remediation. The 
interviewee from Yangquan Economic and Reform Committee also pointed out that at 
this stage, no specific funding mechanisms and tax incentives are devised to support this 










Based on the analysis on policy-making activities in current China and comparison with 
those in the U.S. from Chapter 4, the findings from previous study are interpreted to 
answer the research questions of the study. 
 
 5.1 What programs and policy tools related to brownfield remediation and 
redevelopment are currently adopted and employed in China? 
 
From the analysis of policy-making activities in Chapter 4, I confirmed that (1) the legal 
and regulatory framework of China to deal with brownfield remediation and 
redevelopment is limited, fragmented, and lags behind leading countries; and (2) there is 
great variability in policy-making activities within different provinces and municipalities. 
A handful of them with faster economic development pace have been working on 
establishing a regulatory framework regarding brownfield. 
 
The Table 5.1 summarized the analysis carried out above. From this summary it can be 
seen clearly that, there is a far cry from the framework the U.S has established to 
effectively tackle the issue. At the moment, central and local governments have become 
aware of the environmental, economic and social risks posed by contaminated sites and 
have started to take actions to tackle the issues. Central governmental agencies have 






cleanup criteria and procedures, establish a legal framework, and fund associated 
scientific research. However, the lack of legal status and strong capacity to enforce 
policies makes central government’s efforts faint and ineffective compared to those of 
some local governments.  
Table 5.1 Summary of Policy-Making Activities in both the U.S. and China 
Actions to address obstacles US China 
National Local 
Data Sources    
• Formal program for 
managing information 
✔ Currently being developed. Variable11 
• Classification of sites 
according to risk 
✔ Not clear.12  
Cleanup-Criteria    
• Generic ✔ Currently being developed Variable 
• Review cleanup ✔ Currently being developed Variable 
Liability    





• Certificates of 
compliance 
✔   
• Full protection from 
future liability 
Variable   
Funding    
• Dedicated fund for 
orphan sites 
✔  Variable 
• Financing programs ✔  Variable 
• Incentive programs ✔  Variable 
 
At the local level, proactive and innovative actions taken by public agencies have shown 
an awareness of the importance of contaminated site remediation and redevelopment and 
attempts to find the most workable balance between public and private sectors to 
accommodate the interests of different stakeholders. They are one step further than 
central government to devise effective and affordable policies and programs to 
incorporate the broader ecological, economic and social components of brownfield 
                                                11 “Variable” means a few of provinces and municipalities have related policies and programs. 12 Since the result of national survey (2006) has not made public yet due to the reason of State 






remediation and redevelopment. Municipalities, such as Beijing and Chongqing, are 
advantageous in different aspects with this problem, in a sense, they are testing 
alternative policies and programs to learn what works and what does not. Their 
experience will definitely offer important lessons for the central government to develop a 
comprehensive and effective national framework and for local government to establish its 
own approaches. 
 
 5.2 How is the brownfield remediation and redevelopment project accommodated 
at the local level in the absence of a comprehensive and effective legal and 
regulatory framework?  
 
The second question delved into the problem at the local level, and asked how these 
projects are accommodated in the absence of this framework and the associated 
enforcement. The interviews with local officials from related bureaus provided 
knowledge to the researcher with regards to this question. 
 
It was revealed that there is little public awareness of brownfield remediation and 
redevelopment at the local level. Most of the interviewees are not familiar with this 
concept, or they have comprehensive knowledge of central and provincial policies and 
programs in their related fields associate with brownfield remediation. Only after the 
researcher broke down the whole scheme of brownfield issues, gave an interpretation and 
asked specific questions, such as if there is any program that funds contaminated sites 
cleanup, then they gave feedback. Together with the literature, it is clear that there is no a 






provinces and municipalities, except those mentioned in previous chapters, such as 
Beijing and Chongqing. 
 
Moreover, brownfield remediation and redevelopment projects at the local level are 
accommodated on a case-by-case and separated manner. Brownfield remediation and 
redevelopment entails ecological, economic and social perspectives, such as issues of risk 
assessment, cleanup and remediation, land transfer, land use planning and design. 
However, involved local agencies are only concerned and deal with their responsible 
aspects, lacking inter-agency cooperation. For example, the survey on industrial 
contaminated sites, which is conducted by Yangquan Land and Resources Bureau, 
excluded the local Environmental Protection Bureau. 
 
There is great variability and flexibility in implementation and enforcement of associated 
regulations at the local level. Taking environmental protection bureau as an example, 
local officials are generally reluctant to face and solve contaminated site problems, as 
long as no incident happens that poses serious risks to human health and/or the 
environment, and calls public attention. Moreover, there is no stringent supervision and 
post-evaluation mechanism to monitor contamination and associated remediation 
activities. In some cases, local officials even withhold contamination information on 
purpose. In the case of Wuhan Sanjiang housing development project (2006), Wuhan 
Land Reserve Center purposeful withheld the information, that severe pollution incident 







At the local level, even if they are aware of the seriousness of the problem and realize 
their responsibilities, local authorities don’t have regulatory, technical and financial 
mechanisms or the capacity to tackle the issues. On the other hand, the flexibility and 
variability at the local level allows local officials to innovatively develop workable and 
affordable approaches to realize remediation and redevelopment projects. They employ 
available policy tools and enforcing powers within an existing legal and regulatory 
framework, and negotiate with private investors. For instance, local officials generally 
negotiate and recover soil remediation costs from high land transfer revenue in 
redevelopment projects. This approach is confirmed to be commonly used at the local 
level by the interviewee from Urban Planning Bureau  
 
Through the interaction with local officials in the interviews, I can state that local 
officials generally have less public awareness of the risks of contaminated sites than the 
public media and local residents. Moreover, local officials are generally reluctant to 
reveal information regarding their work, or encourage public participation. 
 
5.3 Recommendations: what improvements and efforts should be made by the 
central government based on the lessons learned from the U.S. experiences? 
 
Generally speaking, in the area of brownfield remediation and redevelopment, China lags 
far behind leading countries such as the U.S. The most important step for the central 
government is to establish a comprehensive and effective legal and regulatory framework 






institutional arrangement and responsibilities, a tiered inventory system, risk-based 
cleanup and remediation criteria, uniformed site assessment and post-evaluation 
mechanism, technical assistance, and effective financing mechanisms. Besides, China 
needs to improve public awareness, information disclosure and local capacity for 
enforcement. 
 
First, since brownfield remediation and redevelopment contains ecological, economic and 
social perspectives, it calls for cooperation and coordination between different levels of 
governments in order to be carried out successfully. Central government should 
incorporate the institutional arrangement and responsibility issue in its effort to establish 
the regulatory framework. Roles and responsibilities of each agency and each level of 
government should be streamlined and clearly defined in the framework to avoid 
overlapping or absent responsibilities and improve effectiveness and efficiency. Local 
capacity and authority to tackle brownfield issue should be supported, encouraged and 
clearly defined in this central governmental framework.  
 
Second, just as in the U.S., the management of the environment is a shared responsibility 
of the federal and state governments, government at federal and central levels should 
focus on general policy-making activities and technical assistance, while local 
governments should develop their own approaches consistent with federal and central 
governmental policies. Local governments in China generally tend to focus on economic 
development and are reluctant to tackle contaminated site remediation issues, as well as 






advantageous in local knowledge (e.g. unique land development needs, specific economic 
and ecological goals) that facilitates brownfield remediation and redevelopment in a more 
workable and affordable way. There is a great variability within different regions of 
China in terms of economic development, technical and knowledge support and 
contamination degrees. Central government should encourage and support local 
governments to build their own capacities and develop specific approaches (e.g. data 
collection, cleanup criteria, risk assessment standards, and financing mechanisms). 
 
Third, with regard to cleanup criteria, most countries used stringent criteria to remediate 
sites to pristine conditions, which has proven to be extremely costly and quite difficult to 
attract private investment to them. International experience has shown that risk-based 
approaches in contaminated site management are better. They introduce less stringent 
generic criteria tied to future land use, a prioritized system to identify remediation 
urgency and more flexible site-specific assessment procedures. Governments accept some 
risk by allowing an acceptable level of contamination and thereby reduce cleanup costs. 
There are large number of contaminated sites and limited availability of remediation 
funds. Moreover, given that, in China, land is owned by the government and most 
industrial sites are owned by state-owned-enterprises, responsibility will ultimately fall 
on the State. It may not be easy to share costs and risks with the private sector as other 
countries have done. Central government should support the employment of this risk-







Fourth, to effectively practice risk-based strategies in contaminated site management, an 
inventory to collect information on site, type, conditions, and risk levels of contaminated 
sites. Local governments should also establish their own inventories consistent with 
central government with information on the sites’ physical and economic potential to 
facilitate site-specific strategies. Specific approaches by local governments to assign legal 
responsibilities, manage orphan sites, and recover associated funding for site remediation 
should be strengthened based on more flexible and workable local practices.  
 
Fifth, financing mechanism is another important factor. Drawn from the U.S. experience, 
all levels of government provide a variety of funding sources and financial incentives to 
support remediation and redevelopment activities. Considering the fact the there are no 
financial mechanisms for brownfield issue at the central level, central government is 
urgent to develop financing mechanism to provide available financial and incentive tools 
(e.g. grants for cleanup, revolving loan funds, taxes deduction, etc.) to both central and 
local governmental agencies to tackle brownfield issues, encourage private investment 
(such as recover cleanup costs from land transfer revenues), reduce cleanup costs and 
fund orphan contaminated sites. 
 
Sixth, at the central level, information disclosure should be strengthened in order to 
improve public awareness and facilitate public participation. While at the local level, 
public awareness of risks of contaminated sites, and ecological, economic and social 
benefits to remediate and redevelop these sites needs to be strengthened among private 






In summary, to cope with the challenge from increasing pressure on brownfield 
remediation and redevelopment, the central government in China should tap into the 
experiences accumulated by other countries, establish its legal, regulatory and 
institutional framework, improve and coordinate existing fragmented policies and 
programs, and figure out most workable balance between public and private sectors to 
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Appendix A: Interview Questions for Local Government Officials (English Version) 
 
Yangquan Municipal Commission of Development and Reform, Shanxi, China 
• Are there any programs, initiatives and policies associate with brownfield 
redevelopment from central, provincial and local levels? 
• What role the commission of development and reform is playing, and what is the 
responsibility associated with brownfield redevelopment? 
• What are the drivers for the government to redevelop underused and abandoned 
industrial sites? 
• What specific aims do the governments expect to achieve? 
• Is there any financial tool to facilitate brownfield redevelopment? 
• What issues associated with brownfield redevelopment are you concerning? 
 
 
Yangquan Municipal Land and Resources Bureau, Shanxi, China 
• Are there any programs, initiatives and policies associate with brownfield 
redevelopment from central, provincial and local levels? 
• Is there any specific program with underused and abandoned industrial land 
investigation, consolidation and revitalization? 
• What incentives the land and resources bureau can provide to facilitate brownfield 
redevelopment? 
• What role the land and resources bureau is playing, and what is the responsibility 
associated with brownfield redevelopment? 
• What issues associated with brownfield redevelopment are you concerning? 
• What work the land and resources bureau are doing associated with underused 
and abandoned industrial land, and what are the short term and long term working 
plans? 
• What obstacles the underused and abandoned industrial site reuse are facing? 
• What legal procedures and steps are required for the land transfer? 
 
 
Yangquan Environmental Protection Bureau, Shanxi, China 
• Are there any programs, initiatives and policies associate with brownfield 
redevelopment from central, provincial and local levels? 
• What role the environmental protection bureau is playing, and what is the 
responsibility associated with brownfield redevelopment? 
• What issues associated with brownfield redevelopment are you concerning? 
• Are there any standards for the contamination assessment? 






• What standards are utilized associated with soil and underwater contaminant 
remediation? 
• Are there any funds associated with contaminant remediation from central, 
provincial and local levels? 
• Who are responsible for the industrial site contamination, and who are responsible 
to pay for the remediation? 
• For the redevelopment of Yanggang site (the case studies in the research), what 
assessment, procedures, and remediation standards were utilized? 
 
Yangquan Urban Planning Bureau, Shanxi, China 
• Are there any programs, initiatives and policies associate with brownfield 
redevelopment from central, provincial and local levels? 
• What role the urban planning bureau is playing, and what is the responsibility 
associated with brownfield redevelopment? 
• What issues associated with brownfield redevelopment are you concerning? 
• What are you able to do to facilitate brownfield redevelopment project under the 
existing legal and regulatory framework? 
• What was the land use planning for redevelopment of the Yanggang site (the case 
studied in the research)? 
• What incentives urban planning can provide to attract redevelopment? 
• What objectives urban planning bureau were expected to achieve, and whose 
interest were expected to protect? 
 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of Yangquan 
Municipal Government, Shanxi, China 
• Are there any programs, initiatives and policies associate with brownfield 
redevelopment from central, provincial and local levels?  
• What role the state-owned assets supervision and administration commission is 
playing, and what is the responsibility associated with brownfield redevelopment? 
• What issues associated with brownfield redevelopment are you concerning? 
• How does the commission negotiate with associated governmental departments 
and private developers to protect the interest of both enterprises and laid-off 
workers? 
• What strategies the commission was using to solve the interest conflict between 
state-owned enterprises and private developers? 
• What policies the commission was utilizing to protect and resettle laid-off 




























































































Appendix C: Interviewee List 
 
To acquire the viewpoints on the legal and regulatory framework associated with local 
brownfield redevelopment, the researcher plans to interview a number of governmental 
officials for the research. A list of those potential interviewees follows13. 
 
 
Yangquan Municipal Commission of Development and Reform, Shanxi, China 
Resource Based Economic Restructuring Office 
山西省阳泉市发展和改革委员会  
 
Yangquan Municipal Land and Resources Bureau, Shanxi, China 
Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Office 
山西省阳泉市国土资源局土地开发整理中心  
 
Yangquan Environmental Protection Bureau, Shanxi, China 
山西省阳泉市环境保护局  
 
Yangquan Urban Planning Bureau, Shanxi, China 
山西省阳泉市规划局  
 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of Yangquan 








                                                13 To protect the interviewees’ right to confidentiality, all names and identifying 
information, expect information on the bureaus they are working for, from the interviews 
were removed and coded. Each interviewee will be assigned a number: I1, I2, I3, I4 and 
I5. A master list that matches the coding number with the identification of each 
interviewee were created after the interviews, so that the researcher, supervisor, and 
chairperson have access to trace the individual data if necessary. The list was stored in 
researcher’s personal computer, which is password protected. Only researcher, 
supervisor, and chairperson have access to this list. Interviewees’ identification 
information will not be revealed to public and other interviewees participating in the 
study before, during and after the study. 
 
